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Ends and Intrinsic Goods in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
Richard Kraut, U. of Illinois at Chicago, for SAGP Central Division, 1987
This paper will consider some connections between NE I and NE X.7-8. I shall 
argue that the two are consistent, and that Aristotle proposes two dominant 
ends, one for the philosophical life, another for the political life.
A. Three kinds of ends in 1.7: I argue against the ultra-inclusivist reading
of Ackrill (in A. Rorty, Essays in Aristotle's Ethics), (a) He implausibly 
makes the more-perfect-than (teleioteros) relation ambiguous, (b) Two of the 
ends said in 1.7 to be perfect but not most perfect (honor, virtue) were 
rejected in 1.5 because they produce a further good, (c) Aristotle gives no 
examples in which x is desirable for the sake of x and y. (d) Such a for-the- 
sake-of relation gives no explanation of why x is desirable.
B. Aristotle's claim that contemplation is pursued solely for its own sake
(X.7 1177b20): This does not mean that failing to have good results is a
good-making characteristic. But this is what he would have to mean, if he 
were merely arguing that contemplation is the best component of happiness.
C. Self-sufficiency in 1.7 and X.7: We need a reading in which one good
(contemplation) can be said to be more self-sufficient than another (ethical 
activity). Ackrill's reading of 1.7 does not allow for this. The key to a 
better interpretation lies in the objection made to the more-is-better 
principle at Topics 117al6-21.
D. The conclusion of the function argument: (a) The most perfect virtue is
theoretical wisdom, but happiness does not consist exclusively in contempla­
tion. The X.7-8 distinction between perfect happiness and a secondary happi­
ness sets up two dominant ends: perfect happiness consists just in contempla­
tion, secondary happiness consists just in the highest form of ethical activi­
ty, i.e. political activity, (b) The phrases "most perfect virtue and "per­
fect virtue" can be understood in terms of 1.7's threefold distinction among 
ends: the virtues that are perfect but not most perfect are the ethical 
virtues integrated with practical wisdom; the virtues that are not perfect are 
the pre-rational virtues of children, (c) The theory of two dominant ends is 
not intended to resolve conflicts between the good of two or more individuals. 
Aristotle is not an egoist; although he thinks that more contemplation is 
always better than less (and this is not just an "other things equal" 
judgment), he does not believe that one should maximize the amount of 
theoretical activity one engages in, regardless of the circumstances. He 
denies that there is any precise rule for deciding whose interest should be 
promoted, when interests conflict. Sometimes, for the good of others, one 
should choose the less desirable of two lives, (d) So read, the function 
argument begins the defense of both kinds of lives, philosophical and politi­
cal. Aristotle thinks there is a similarity between the two lives, in that 
each is devoted to the excellent use of reason as an ultimate end. The 
similarity of political activity to contemplation underlies Aristotle's 
defense of the ethical virtues.
E. Aristotle's complaint about the mean in VI.l: When we see that there are
two dominant ends in the NE, the rest of VI and X.6-8 can be read as a good 
answer to Aristotle's question. Each ultimate end tells us how much to pursue 
others goods, how angry to be, etc.
